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Resilience of Electricity Distribution Networks
Part I: Cyber-physical Disruption Models
Devendra Shelar, Saurabh Amin, and Ian Hiskens
Abstract—This work contributes to the need for
developing a systematic approach to evaluate and im-
prove the resilience of electricity distribution networks
(DNs) to cyber-physical failure events. We introduce
a network model that captures the joint impact of
physical failures in the transmission network and a class
of cyberattacks (security failures) on DNs. Such failures
can result in voltage disturbances and supply-demand
disturbances at multiple DN nodes. The model is used
to formulate a bilevel mixed-integer problem that cap-
tures the sequential interaction between an attacker
(leader) and the DN operator (follower). The attacker
(resp. operator) aims to maximize (resp. minimize) the
post-contingency loss resulting from the cyber-physical
failure events. We solve this problem by transforming
it to an equivalent min-cardinality disruption problem
and applying the Benders Decomposition algorithm.
Our solution approach relies on a reformulation of
the “coupling constraints” which model the effects of
the attacker’s discrete actions on the set of feasible
operator response strategies. We evaluate the opera-
tor’s value of implementing a timely response via the
substation automation as the net reduction in post-
contingency loss compared to the case of autonomous
disconnections. This reduction can be viewed as the
improvement in DN resiliency against the class of
cyber-physical failure events.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical systems, network se-
curity, smart grids, bilevel optimization
I. Introduction
Despite the recent trends in modernization of electricity
Distribution Networks (DNs), many Distribution System
Operators (DSOs) continue to face both strategic and
operational challenges in ensuring a reliable and secure
service to their customers. On one hand, the integration
of new supply sources such as Distributed Generators
(DGs) and new monitoring and control capabilities enable
flexible DN operations [1, 2, 3, 4]. On the other hand,
these capabilities also expose the vulnerabilities of DNs to
remote adversaries [5, 6, 7, 8], which can include criminal
organizations, terrorist groups, and even nation states.
Security threats to DNs can escalate in the presence
of intermittent disturbances in the Transmission Network
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(TN), or during conditions when the power system is close
to an emergency state [9, 10, 11]. It is well-recognized
that significant cyber-physical failures in TN/DN – in-
dividually or in combination – can result in a sudden
disruption, potentially leading to contingencies such as
violations in the operating bounds of system states and/or
loss in the functionality of network components. This
paper is motivated by the DSO’s need for responding to
such contingencies in a timely manner to prevent (or at
least delay) the automatic protection mechanisms from
triggering and causing extensive uncontrolled load/DG
disconnects (outage). Our main hypothesis is that the
operational flexibility of modern DNs can be exploited to
generate a timely response to cyber-physical failures. We
show that such a response can lead to significant reduction
in the post-contingency losses. This capability becomes es-
pecially important for DNs facing risk of correlated failures
under which the traditional protection mechanisms may no
longer be adequate or not trigger at all.
More broadly, we contribute to a systematic framework
for evaluating DN resilience. Generically, resilience of a
system is defined as “its ability to prepare and plan for, ab-
sorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse
events” [12]. Indeed, previous literature has dealt with
issues related to resiliency of power systems [6, 10, 11].
However, these approaches do not explicitly model the
combined effects of TN- and DN-side failure scenarios on
the losses faced by the DSO, and hence cannot be directly
used to evaluate the effectiveness of available response
strategies. In this paper and its companion paper [13], we
develop a simple yet generic approach to address this gap
in the literature.
We say that a DN with an operational response capabil-
ity is more resilient to a class of cyber-physical failures if
the DSO incurs a lesser post-contingency loss when sub-
jected to these failures, relative to the loss under classical
protection mechanisms (e.g. autonomous disconnections).
Indeed, defining a relevant class of failure scenarios, DSO
response, and acceptable extent of post-contingency loss
are all important aspects of the problem. Also important
is a computationally tractable approach to evaluate “worst
case” post-contingency loss.
We fully address these aspects in the context of a linear
power flow model. We first introduce an attack model to
capture DN-side failure scenarios that are relevant to cy-
berphysical security of DNs [5]. We argue that the impact
of such security failures may be aggravated under TN-side
reliability failures. To begin with, we model the impact of
TN-side failure as a voltage sag (drop in the substation
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
01
74
6v
3 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
0 M
ay
 20
19
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL NETWORK SYSTEMS 2
voltage), and that of DN-side security failures as supply-
demand disturbances at the DN nodes. A plausible attack
scenario that can be studied using this model is one in
which a remote control functionality (e.g. DG management
system, DGMS) is compromised by an external attack [5].
To model a DSO’s response capability, we consider
different operations supported by modern DNs: remote
control by the control center, autonomous disconnects of
components due to activation of local protection systems,
and emergency control by the Substation Automation
(SA) systems (Sec. II). We pose a bilevel optimization
problem for evaluating the maximum post-contingency
loss when the DSO optimally responds to the attack,
and present a computational approach to solve it. We
formulate this problem as a Bilevel Mixed Integer Problem
(BiMIP). In principle, the Benders Decomposition (BD)
algorithm can be applied to solve such formulations. How-
ever, it is shown in Sec. IV that in our problem, only
binary variables enter in the coupling constraints. It turns
out that, in such cases, a straightforward application of
the BD algorithm does not generate useful Benders cuts.
Our solution approach addresses this issue by formulating
an equivalent min-cardinality disruption problem, and
reformulating the coupling constraints to ensure that the
set of attacks are progressively refined in each iteration of
the BD algorithm (Sec. VI-B).
Several papers have used bilevel optimization formula-
tions for vulnerability assessment of TNs to adversarial
disruptions [7, 9, 10, 11]. A notable application is the
generalization of the classical N-1 security problem to an
N-k problem [9, 11]. These formulations typically assume
the DC power flow approximation, which enables a KKT-
based reformulation, and leads to a single-level Mixed-
Integer Program (MIP). In our past work, we used a sim-
ilar formulation to assess the security of DNs to remotely
induced DG disruptions [4, 8]. However, that formulation
did not consider preemptive tripping of loads/DGs as a
part of the operator’s response strategy, and thus it did
not require the inner problem of the bilevel program to
have integer variables. A relatively simple greedy heuristic
gave reasonable performance in that case. In this paper, we
deal with a bilevel program with mixed-integer variables
in the inner problem.
Our main contributions include:
p‹q An approach to evaluate the resilience of DNs based
on post-contingency losses (Sec. II) by modeling the
physical impact on a DN due to a class of cyber-
physical failures which consists of disruptions due to
DN-side security failures as well as TN-side reliability
failures (Sec. IV), and
p‹q an extended Benders Decomposition approach for
solving BiMIPs in which the coupling constraints con-
sist only of binary variables (Sec. VI), and using this
approach for computing post-contingency losses un-
der different operator response capabilities (Sec. V).
II. Evaluating resilience of DNs
Broadly speaking, the response capabilities of modern
DN systems can be classified as follows: (a) Remote
control of nodal demand and/or supply sources by the
DSO/control center; (b) autonomous disconnect operation
of individual components; for example protection tripping
of DGs or loads under nodal violations in operating con-
ditions; and (c) emergency control at the substation level
which is executed by the Substation Automation (SA)
system, and includes preemptive response actions such as
load control and/or disconnection of components. Fig. 1
provides an illustration of these three distinct control ca-
pabilities. The autonomous disconnect operation is based
on local (protection-type) checks of operating bounds at
the DN nodes. On the other hand, operator response via
the control center or the SA system utilizes information
from DN meters that include node-level consumption, dis-
tributed generation, and nodal voltages. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the emergency control actions (c) subsume
the autonomous actions (b) by making decisions that are
coordinated across the SA system. Hence, (b) and (c) are
never simultaneously active.
To describe our modeling approach, we focus on a
specific attack model: the compromise of remote control
capabilities of the control center. Hence, (a) can no longer
provide a viable response, but (b) and (c) always provide
reliable responses. Thus, it becomes imperative to clearly
distinguish these response capabilities and model the re-
sulting network state.
- Load control (c)
- Disconnections (c)
- Local/Autonomous
Disconnects (b)
Targeted
attack
TN
SA
substation
Control center
–Dispatch
–fault/outage
management
–DGMS
´∆v0
TN-side disturbance
DN-side
disturbance
(a)
(c)
emergency
control
DG
Load
Load
DG
Fig. 1: Attacker-operator interaction.
In our model, the DSO response (c) is comprised of
load control and preemptive tripping of components (loads
and/or DGs), and can be operationalized via the SA
system (refer to (c) in Fig. 1). The SA systems were
recently provided cyber-security reperimeterisation by the
NERC regulations [14]. In contrast, newer control center
operations such as DGMS are prone to back channel
attacks by remote third parties, as evident from the recent
incidents [15]. By evaluating the reduction in loss due to
a timely DSO response, and comparing it with the loss
under the autonomous disconnections, we can estimate the
value of the timely response toward improving the DN’s
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resilience.
We formulate a bilevel problem to model the sequential
interaction between the strategic attacker and operator;
see [4, 9, 16, 17] for similar formulations. Our problem
can be stated as follows:
LMm :“ max
dPDk
min
uPU pdq
L pu, xq s.t. x P X puq , (P1)
where LMm denotes the Max-min (Mm) post-contingency
loss used for evaluating the DN’s resilience; d an attacker-
induced failure; k the attacker’s resource constraint; Dk
the set of attacker’s strategies; u an operator response;
U pdq the coupling constraints that define the set of feasible
operator responses under the impact of attack-induced
failures; L pu, xq is the loss function, the form of which
is presented in Sec. V-C; x the post-contingency network
state, i.e. the state after the attacker-operator interaction
is completed; X the set of constraints that model physical
constraints (power flows), component constraints (loads
and DGs), and nodal voltage constraints (Sec. III). For
a given disruption d P Dk, the operator’s objective is
to minimize the post-contingency loss L pu, xq, and the
attacker’s objective is to choose an attack that maximizes
the post-contingency loss assuming an optimal response by
the operator. Suppose that pd‹, u‹q is an optimal solution
to this maximin problem which results in the network state
x‹. Then LMm “ L pu‹, x‹q is the post-contingency loss
that is incurred by the operator when he implements u‹
in response to the attack d‹ (Sec. VI-A).
Note that the post-contingency loss LMm is a measure
of the maximum reduction in system performance under
the class of disruptions in the set Dk; see Fig. 2. For the
sake of normalization, we denote by Lmax the loss incurred
when all loads and DGs are disconnected. Then, RMm :“
100
´
1´ LMmLmax
¯
can be considered as a metric of the DN
resilience under operator response (in the set of responses
U ).
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Fig. 2: Performance under various response capabilities.
Now suppose that we want to compare the DN resilience
under SA system action to the case of autonomous dis-
connections. To do this comparison, we need to estimate
the maximum loss corresponding to automatic disconnects
of DN components (refer to (b) in Fig. 1) that would
be induced by a maximally disruptive attack in the set
Dk (due to compromise of (a) in Fig. 1). In Sec. V-A,
we present a simple algorithm to estimate the uncon-
trolled cascade-like loss in load/DG connectivity due to
operating voltage bound violations, and in Sec. VI-C,
we present an approximate algorithm to estimate the
worst case loss under autonomous disconnections. Let the
automatic disconnect actions be denoted by unr, result-
ing network state by xnr, and the corresponding loss by
LAD “ Lpxnr, unr). Then, the resilience metric of the
DN under autonomous disconnections can be written as
RAD “ 100p1 ´ LAD{Lmaxq. Naturally, RMm ě RAD, and
we can evaluate the relative value of operational response
(or equivalently, the improvement in DN resilience) as
pRMm´RADq. In Sec. VII, we evaluate this quantity for a
set of test DNs.
More generally, Fig. 2 illustrates the evolution of sys-
tem performance over time after the attacker-operator
interaction. Initially, the DN is operating under nominal
conditions. As a result of the TN/DN-side disturbances,
the system performance degrades. If the operator fails to
respond in a timely manner (in less than a few seconds),
then an uncontrolled cascade can occur (resulting in a
post-contingency loss LAD). However, to regain nominal
operation, the operator eventually undertakes secondary
control actions like changing tap settings of transform-
ers, or switching on capacitor banks. Then, the nodal
voltages recover, allowing the disconnected components
to be reconnected and operate within safety bounds. In
the companion paper [13], we address other aspects of
DN resilience such as microgrid capabilities to further
minimize the post-contingency loss, as well as reconnection
of disrupted DGs to enable faster DN recovery.
III. Network Model
We model the DN as a tree network of node set NŤt0u
and line set E; see Fig. 3. We refer the reader to Table I
for the definitions of key notation, and to references [3, 8]
for further details.
Nominal load
pck ` jqck
pck ` jqck
Actual load
pgl ` jqgl
Actual
generation
Nominal
generation
pgl ` jqgl
0
v0
i
vi
j
vj
k
vk
l
vl
Power flow
Pij ` jQij
rij ` jxij
impedance
Substation
node
G “ pN, Eq
Fig. 3: DN model.
For the sake of computational simplicity, we model the
power flows using the classical LinDistFlow model [18]:
Pij “
ÿ
k:pj,kqPE
Pjk ` pj @ pi, jq P E (1)
Qij “
ÿ
k:pj,kqPE
Qjk ` qj @ pi, jq P E (2)
vj “ vi ´ 2 prijPij ` xijQijq @ pi, jq P E, (3)
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DN parameters
N set of nodes in DN
E set of edges in DN
0 substation node label
G radial topology of DN, G “ pNŤt0u, Eq
N “ |N| number of non-substation nodes in DN
j complex square root of ´1, j “ ?´1
vnom nominal squared voltage magnitude (1 pu)
v0 squared voltage magnitude at substation node
Nodal quantities of node i P N
vi squared voltage magnitude at node i
pci ` jqci nominal demand at node i
pgi ` jqgi nominal generation at node i
pci ` jqci actual power consumed at node i
pgi ` jqgi actual power generated at node i
pi ` jqi net power consumed at node i
vci,vci lower, upper voltage bounds for load at node i
vg
i
,vgi lower, upper voltage bounds for DG at node i
kgi 0 if DG at node i is connected to DN; 1 otherwise
kci 0 if load at node i is connected to DN; 1 otherwise
βi fraction of demand satisfied at node i
β
i
lower bound of load control parameter βi
Parameters of edge pi, jq P E
Pij ` jQij power flowing from node i to node j
rij ,xij resistance and reactance of line pi, jq P E
Attack variables
d P t0, 1uN di “ 1 if DG at node i is disrupted; 0 otherwise.
Operator response variables
u an operator response action
TABLE I: Table of Notations.
where (1)-(2) are the power conservation equations and
(3) is the voltage drop equation.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each node of
the DN has a load and a DG. Furthermore, we consider
the constant power model for both loads and DGs.1
DG model: We assume that each DG is connected to
the DN via an inverter. Let sgi :“ pgi ` jqgi denote the
nominal complex power supplied at node i P G, where pgi
is the active power supplied by the DG and qgi is the
reactive power supplied by its inverter. For the sake of
simplicity, we refer to the DG-inverter assembly as simply
DG. Now, depending on whether a DG is connected to the
network or not, its actual output is related to its nominal
output as follows:
pgi “ p1´ kgiqpgi, qgi “ p1´ kgiqqgi. (4)
According to the IEEE standard rules for interconnec-
tion of DGs [19], to ensure safety as well as proper func-
tioning of the components, DGs are required to disconnect
from the DN if voltage bound violations occur.2 We model
1More generally, loads can be modeled using the constant
impedance (Z), constant current (I), constant power (P) or a general
ZIP model, or even voltage dependent loads as the load power
consumption can also change due to voltage deviations. Our network
model can be extended to include more general load models.
2Note that the tripping of DGs may also happen for other
reasons such as frequency bound violations, which we consider in
the companion paper [13].
this constraint as follows:
kgi ě vgi ´ vi, kgi ě vi ´ vgi @ i P N. (5)
Load model: In many smart DNs, the operator can
change the actual consumption of a connected load to a
fraction of its nominal demand via direct load control in
response to supply-demand disturbances [2]. We model
this flexibility as the choice of load control parameter
βi P rβi, 1s when kci “ 0, and βi “ 0 when kci “ 1.
Here β
i
P r0, 1s denotes the minimum fraction of the
load’s nominal demand that should be satisfied provided
the load is connected. This load control capability can be
represented as the mixed-integer linear constraints:
pci “ βipci, qci “ βiqci @ i P N, (6)
where
p1´ kciqβi ď βi ď p1´ kciq @ i P N. (7)
Similar to DGs, the connectivity of loads also depends on
the nodal voltages which can be modeled as follows:
kci ě vci ´ vi, kci ě vi ´ vci @ i P N. (8)
Then, the net actual consumption at nodes is given by:
pi “ pci ´ pgi, qi “ qci ´ qgi @ i P N. (9)
We define the network state x P R5N as x :“ pp, q, P,Q, vq,
where p, q, P, Q, v are vectors of appropriate dimensions.
IV. Cyber-Physical Failure Model
We now discuss a generic cyber-physical failure model
that captures the effects of DN-side component disruptions
caused by security failures as well as effects of disturbances
from the TN.
Our attack model is motivated by the security failure
scenarios discussed in [5]. These scenarios capture the
capabilities of the following threat actors: (i) cyber-hackers
of an enemy nation motivated to disrupt supply to critical
facilities, (ii) a malicious adversary looking to extort ran-
som money from the utility, or (iii) a disgruntled internal
employee motivated by revenge. In this paper, we are
concerned with type (i) actors. Such actors can leverage
existing vulnerabilities in DN cyber architecture such as
non-confidentiality of control commands, lack of multi-
factor authentication, and incorrect firewall rules that
allow unauthorized access. Particularly, a threat actor can
exploit these vulnerabilities to launch replay attacks [20],
or a server-side attack at the control center, or hack
operator credentials, any of which could allow him to
perform malicious activities such as mass remote discon-
nect of components. We model the DN-side disruptions
as nodal supply-demand disturbances. For example, mass
disconnects of DGs (resp. loads) can cause loss of supply
(resp. demand). Additionally, a threat actor could program
his attack to be launched simultaneously with a TN-side
disruption. A high-level framework for modeling impact of
cyber-physical disruptions to DN is illustrated in Fig. 4.
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Threat actors Vulnerabilities Threats
Disconnect
commands
DN-side
disruptions
TN-side
disturbances
Supply-demand
disturbances
at DN nodes
Voltage
disturbance at
substation node
Operator response
– Load control, component
disconnections (Part I)
– microgrid islanding,
DN restoration (Part II)
Contingencies
Post-contingency loss
Fig. 4: Framework for modeling impact of cyber-physical
failures on DNs.
DN-side disruption: Our attack model is relevant in
the context of smart DNs, with a hierarchical control archi-
tecture as illustrated in Fig. 1; for further details we refer
the reader to [21]. In this architecture, the main controller
resides in the DN control center and performs the tradi-
tional tasks such as the optimization of DN operations
and Volt-VAr control during nominal operations. Besides,
it also provides flexibility to implement new functionalities
such as DGMS. An attack on the DN control center server
can affect one or more of these functionalities. For the sake
of concreteness, we limit our attention to a specific attack
scenario in which the attacker targets the DGMS server,
with the aim to simultaneously disrupt multiple DGs
connected to the DN. However, our modeling approach is
general in that it can also accommodate other important
attack scenarios such as mass remote disconnects of loads
or invalid load control commands [5].3
Let d P t0, 1uN be a vector denoting the disrupted
nodes, where di “ 1 if node i is disrupted, otherwise
di “ 0. Let k be the maximum number of nodes that
the attacker can disrupt (i.e. resource constraint), and let
Dk :“ td P t0, 1uN | řiPN di ď ku denote the set of feasible
attacker strategies. This constraint limits the attacker’s
ability to disrupt an arbitrary number of nodes, and a
particular choice of k needs adequate justification. For the
purpose of evaluating a DN’s resilience to security attacks,
one can consider that the existing fail-safe mechanisms
employed by the operator (including the in-built “hard”
security checks within the DGMS software) do not permit
simultaneous disruption of DG nodes beyond a certain
limit. This limit can be taken as the choice of k.
It is also reasonable to assume that by compromising
the DGMS, the attacker can access information needed to
strategically choose the disruption vector d. This includes
DN topology, line resistances and reactances, nominal
nodal demands and DG outputs, and the value of substa-
tion voltage deviation due to TN-side disturbance. Note
that this data is already collected by the DGMS to control
DG output (e.g. for Volt-VAr regulation).
Furthermore, our attack model considers that the con-
3An attack on a DN control center can also be used to open circuit
breakers. We consider this attack in the companion paper [13].
trol center functionalities such as DGMS are more viable
targets for remote external attackers than local substation
automation (SA) systems. Indeed, recent incidents [15]
have confirmed that control center/DGMS servers can be
targets of sophisticated phishing attacks (e.g. through a
download of infected email attachments by the human
operators who manage these servers). In contrast, a grow-
ing number of distribution utilities are regulated under
NERC CIP standards which secure the substations against
remote attacks via reperimetrisation of the substation
cyber architecture [14, 22]. In addition, SA is typically
not prone to insecure actions by human insiders.
Now we model the impact of an attacker’s actions on
the DN state. If the attacker disrupts a DG at node i,
then that DG becomes non-operational, and is effectively
disconnected from the DN, i.e
kgi ě di @ i P N. (10)
The disconnections of DGs and their inverters lead to
a sudden drop in active as well as reactive power supply.
Under heavy loading (high demand) conditions, reactive
power often cannot be supplied from the bulk supply
sources through the transmission lines. The reactive power
shortfall may be exacerbated by a voltage dip resulting
from a TN-side disturbance, as discussed below. This may
result in sustained low-voltage conditions, e.g. a fault-
induced delayed voltage recovery (FIDVR) event [23, 24]
and/or result in voltage collapse.
TN-side disturbance: Our model of TN-side distur-
bances is motivated by situations such as failure of a
transmission line or a bulk generator, which result in low
voltage conditions that last for a prolonged period (several
minutes). We model its impact as a sudden drop in the
substation node’s voltage by ∆v0, which we assume to
be exogenously given (and fixed). Thus, the substation
voltage in the presence of a TN-side disturbance can be
written as:
v0 “ vnom ´∆v0. (11)
Indeed, ∆v0 “ 0 indicates no TN-side disturbance.
Note that a TN-side disturbance can also result in a
change in frequency away from the nominal operating
frequency of the network. We extend our model to include
frequency disturbances in [13]. Finally, we emphasize that
the impact of attack-induced disruptions on a DN can
be quite severe when the DN is simultaneously facing
such a TN-side disturbance. For instance, the attacker
can program the DN-side attack to be launched when a
substation voltage drops at least by ∆v0.
V. Operator response models
Recall from Sec. II that the two operator response
capabilities which we consider are the autonomous dis-
connect operations and emergency control by substation
automation. Now, we describe these response capabilities
in detail.
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A. Autonomous Component Disconnections
The autonomous disconnect operation is based on local
checks of operating bounds at the DN nodes. Such protec-
tion functions are consistent with legacy DN management
systems where the operator does not have access to node-
level data. Consequently, an operator relying solely on this
response capability does not have the ability to timely
detect, accurately identify, and promptly respond to co-
ordinated supply-demand disturbances in the DN induced
by the attack in our model.
To model the network state under response (b), we
adopt and refine the cascade algorithm used in [25]. This
algorithm is well-suited for modeling forced tripping of
network components under operating bound violations.
Specifically, Algorithm 1 takes the initial network state
at the start of an attack-induced contingency (denoted
xnr), and generates automatic disconnect actions for one
or more components, as the state evolves over multiple
rounds of an uncontrolled cascade. Let the vector of
variables representing the automatic disconnect actions be
denoted by unr “ pβnr, kcnr, kgnrq. In each round of the
cascade, unr is updated based on disconnect actions of the
DGs that violate the voltage bounds in that round. These
actions are determined by checking (5). Then, new power
flows are computed after each round of disconnection by
recomputing xnr. Next, the set of all loads which violate
the voltage bounds in (8) is computed, and all the loads
in this set are disconnected. Note that the load control
parameter βnri “ 1 throughout the cascading disconnects
of DGs, unless the load becomes fully disconnected, in
which case it switches to βnri “ 0. Since at least one DG
disconnect happens in each round, the algorithm termi-
nates in at most N+1 rounds, where the last round corre-
sponds to load disconnects. The final connectivity vector
unr corresponds to a situation where all the connected
components satisfy voltage bounds, and can be used to
compute the post-contingency state and the corresponding
loss.
Algorithm 1 Uncontrolled cascade under response (b)
Input: attacker action d (initial contingency)
1: unr, xnr Ð GetCascadeFinalState(d)
2: function GetCascadeFinalState(d)
3: Initialize unr “ pβnr, kcnr, kgnrq “ p1,0, dq
4: Compute state xnr using (1)-(4), (6), (7), and (9)
5: while D i such that (5) is violated do
6: Set kgnri “ 1, update unr
7: Recompute xnr using (1)-(4), (6), (7), and (9)
8: end while
9: Compute I “ ti P N | such that (8) is violatedu
10: for each i P I do
11: Set βnri “ 0, kcnri “ 1
12: end for
13: Update unr, recompute xnr
14: return unr, xnr
15: end function
In Algorithm 1, DGs disconnect before the loads discon-
nect. This can be justified by considering a sudden voltage
drop. Such voltage behavior can be indicative of a fault
within the DN, and therefore DGs supplying power to a
fault can be potentially dangerous. Therefore, according
to [19], when voltage bound violations occur, the DGs
are supposed to disconnect within two seconds or less,
depending on the extent of the voltage drop. On the other
hand, the loads can continue to operate even a minute
after mild or moderate voltage bound violations occur.
Indeed, we can infer this from the fact that the response
time of voltage regulators along DN feeders is typically at
least 15 to 30 seconds [23, 26]. However, the disconnect
actions of loads happen due to activation of protection
devices which operate based on local measurements, i.e.
they operate independent of each other. Therefore, in the
worst case all loads experiencing voltage bound violations
may disconnect together. Hence, our choice to consider the
disconnection of all the loads in set I within one round is
reasonable.
B. Emergency Response by Substation Automation
The emergency response capability (refer (c) in Fig. 1)
of modern SA systems is enabled by fine-grained data col-
lection of node-level consumption, distributed generation,
and nodal voltages. Many of the newer installations of
smart meters are already equipped with data logging and
communication capabilities. As a side note, the temporal
frequency of data collected by low-voltage residential me-
ters can vary from 15 minute to 24 hour intervals, depend-
ing on the desired control functionalities, customer privacy
levels provided by the operator as well as the available
communication bandwidth between DN nodes and the SA.
In contrast, for the purpose of emergency response, meters
installed at medium voltage to low voltage transformers
at DN nodes can be utilized to provide aggregated node-
level data from the customer meters in real-time (every
second). With this capability, sudden changes in local DG
output can also be detected by the SA, thereby enabling
the operator to identify the attack vector d. This level
of monitoring does not involve individual customer meter
readings, and hence, does not violate privacy regulations.
Thus, the currently available capabilities of collection
and processing of node-level data can be exploited by the
operator to implement fast response strategies through
SA. In particular, we consider that node-level data can
be used to determine the required load control (β) and
intentional preemptive disconnects (kg, kc) that respect
constraints (5) and (8), and that this response is exercised
through the SA. Let the set of allowable load control
vectors be defined as B :“ śiPNpt0uŤrβi, 1sq. Then,
we can denote an operator response strategy as u “
pβ, kc, kgq P U , where U :“ Bˆ t0, 1uN ˆ t0, 1uN . Finally,
we can denote the set of response strategies feasible after
an attack d by U pdq :“ tu P U | such that (10) holdsu.
Traditional response to voltage regulation: Indeed,
other types of classical actions implemented through con-
trol of voltage regulators and capacitors as well as net-
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work reconfiguration can also form part of the operator
response. However, we chose load control and intentional
disconnects due to timing requirements. The time-scale of
the disturbance created by the attack can be very small
(few seconds), and can trigger an immediate cascade of
component disconnects due to operating bound violations.
Typically, voltage regulators and capacitor banks require
a longer response time; in fact, frequent activation of these
devices is discouraged as they are subject to mechanical
wear and tear [27]. On the other hand, thanks to advances
in SA and power electronics based control of loads/DGs,
our response strategy can be implemented within a few
milliseconds after the information about the timing and
extent of the disruption is obtained by the SA. Our
modeling approach can be extended to situations where
appropriate changes in the settings of voltage regulators
and capacitor banks are deemed to be desirable aspects
of operator response; these can be incorporated as integer
decision variables in the inner problem of (P1).
C. Post-contingency loss
Let L denote the post-contingency loss incurred by the
operator. We define it as the sum of following costs: (i) cost
due to loss of voltage regulation, (ii) cost of load control,
and (iii) cost of load shedding:
Lpu, xq “ WVR ‖vnom ´ v‖8 `WLC
ř
iPN p1´ βiqpci
`pWLS ´WLCqřiPN kcipci, (12)
where WLC P R` denotes the cost of per unit load
controlled, WLS P R` and WLS ě WLC is the cost in
dollars of per unit load shed, and WVR P R` is the cost of
unit absolute deviation of nodal voltage from the nominal
value vnom “ 1 pu. The weight WLS ´WLC is chosen to
enable proper counting of the cost of load control when
the load is disconnected.
Remark 1. We have included the cost of load shedding, but
not the cost of disconnection of customer-owned DGs be-
cause the customers are likely to face more inconvenience if
there is load shedding, in comparison to DG disconnections
during a contingency. However, we can easily account for
the cost of DG disconnections in our formulation.
We say that if no components are disconnected after
the attacker-operator interaction, the DN is in the No-
Disconnect (ND) regime; otherwise, it’s in the Component-
Disconnected (CD) regime. In the CD regime, the operator
incurs an additional cost over the ND regime in the form
of compensation to the consumers whose loads are com-
pletely disconnected; see (12). Note that, in our model, the
CD regime can result from an uncontrolled cascade under
autonomous disconnections, or from emergency response
by the SA system.
VI. Bilevel Optimization Problem
A. Formulation
Let X denote the set of post-contingency states x that
satisfy the constraints (1)-(9). Then, we can model the
attacker-operator interaction in the presence of TN-side
disturbance by refining (P1) as follows:
LMm :“ max
dPDk
min
uPU pdq
L pu, xq
s.t. x P X puq , (11).
(Mm)
Thus, the attacker’s (resp. operator’s) objective is to max-
imize (resp. minimize) the loss L subject to LinDistFlow
(1)-(3), DG and load models (4)-(9), and the failure impact
captured by u P U pdq and (11). We refer the problem
(Mm) as the Budget-k-max-loss problem, where k is the
budget of the attacker and determines Dk.
In the case of autonomous disconnections, for a given
attacker action d, Algorithm 1 allows us to compute the
final state of operator variables unr and network state xnr.
We can then evaluate the post-contingency loss L punr, xnrq
for an attack-induced DG disruption vector d P Dk in
the autonomous disconnections case by using (12). For
any given attack cardinality k, we denote the maximum
over the post-contingency losses of all attacks by LAD.
The optimal attack vector can be computed by simple
enumeration over attacks of cardinality k. However, we will
present an algorithm in Sec. VI-C to efficiently estimate
LAD.
B. Solution Approach
To evaluate the post-contingency loss in the case of
emergency response by the SA, we need to solve the bilevel
problem (Mm), which has binary variables in both inner
and outer problems. In general, such BiMIP problems are
NP-hard and are computationally challenging to solve [16,
25]. Our solution approach relies on using the Benders
Decomposition (BD) algorithm to approximately solve
(Mm) on a reformulated problem. The overall approach
can be described as follows. First, we argue that LMm
can be obtained by solving an equivalent Min-cardinality
disruption problem instead. Then, we apply the BD algo-
rithm, which decomposes the min-cardinality problem into
a master (attacker) problem (an integer program) and an
operator subproblem (a mixed-integer program), and then
solves these two problems in an iterative manner, until
either an optimal min-cardinality attack is obtained or all
the attacks are exhausted.
Min-cardinality disruption problem: Recall that in
problem (Mm), the attacker’s goal is to determine an
optimal attack of size at most k (attack resource). On the
other hand, in the min-cardinality problem, the attacker
computes a disruption with as few attacked DN nodes as
possible to induce a loss to the operator greater than a pre-
specified threshold target post-contingency loss, denoted
Ltarget. These two problems are equivalent to each other
in the following sense. The loss LMm in (Mm) is non-
decreasing in k (due to the inequality constraint
ř
iPN di ď
k). Therefore, if the parameter Ltarget is gradually in-
creased then the minimum attack cardinality computed by
min-cardinality problem will be non-decreasing in Ltarget.
Thus, for a fixed budget k, the smallest Ltarget value at
which the minimum attack cardinality changes from k to
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k ` 1 will be the optimal value of problem (Mm). By
implementing a binary search on the parameter 100LtargetLmax
between 0 ´ 100%, we can determine the smallest Ltarget
at which the minimum attack cardinality changes from
k to k ` 1. Conversely, if we can solve (Mm), then by
implementing a binary search on the parameter k between
0 and N, we can determine the minimum attack cardinality
whose optimal loss exceeds Ltarget.
It turns out that application of the BD algorithm to the
min-cardinality problem decomposes the min-cardinality
problem into two single-level MIPs, namely the master
(attacker) problem and the operator subproblem. The
master problem only has the attack variables, integral-
ity constraints, and the Benders cuts; and its objective
function is bounded. If the BD algorithm were applied to
the budget-k-max-loss problem instead, the corresponding
master problem will have variables d and u and (1)-(11) as
constraints. Besides the computational advantage in solv-
ing the min-cardinality problem, the quantity 100LtargetLmax is
relevant from the viewpoint of DN resilience. For example,
if we want to evaluate whether or not a DN is 80% resilient
to a k cardinality attack, we can set Ltarget “ 0.2Lmax,
and then check if the optimal value of the min-cardinality
problem is smaller than or equal k.
Now, we detail an approach to solve the min-cardinality
problem. For given load and DG connectivity vectors kc
and kg , we define a configuration vector as κ :“ pkc, kgq.
Given an attack vector d, let Kpdq :“ tpkc, kgq P t0, 1uNˆ
t0, 1uN such that (10) holdsu, i.e. Kpdq denotes the set of
all possible post-disruption configuration vectors that the
operator can choose from. Then, for a fixed attack d and a
fixed configuration vector κ P Kpdq, consider the following
linear program:
P pd, κq :“ minβPB L pu, xq
s.t. u “ pβ, κq , x P X puq , (11). (O-LP)
Note that (O-LP) may not have feasible solutions as the
chosen configuration vector κ may violate (5) or (8) in the
set of constraints Xpuq. In this case, the value of P pd, κq
is set to 8.
Suppose that, for a given DN, we are concerned with
a TN-side disturbance ∆v0 and a target Ltarget post-
contingency loss. We say that an attack-induced disruption
d P Dk defeats a configuration κ P Kpdq if P pd, κq ě
Ltarget, and is successful if it defeats every κ P Kpdq.
The above definition is analogous to the definition of
successful attack considered in [9]. We can now state the
Min-cardinality disruption problem as follows:
min
dPt0,1uN
ÿ
iPN
di
s.t. P pd, κq ě Ltarget @ κ P Kpdq.
(MCP)
If there exists an optimal solution of the problem (MCP),
say d‹, then it is a min-cardinality disruption correspond-
ing to Ltarget because it is successful and has minimum
number of attacked nodes.
However, problem (MCP) is not tractable in its current
form because the number of constraints is equal to the
cardinality of set Kpdq which can be exponential in |N|,
and verifying each constraint pP pd, κq ě Ltargetq is itself
a linear optimization problem. Fortunately, the BD algo-
rithm can be applied to address this issue.
Benders Decomposition: The algorithm decomposes
(MCP) into two relatively simpler mixed-integer (MIP)
subproblems: attacker subproblem (A-MIP) and operator
subproblem (O-MIP). Both these problems are then solved
in an iterative manner. In fact, in each iteration, one needs
to solve (A-MIP), (O-MIP), and the dual of the problem in
(O-LP), as discussed below. Fig. 5 summarizes the overall
approach.
Original BiMIP (Mm)
Min-cardinality
disruption
problem (MCP)
Attacker MIP
min
d
ř
i di
s.t. Benders cuts
di P t0, 1u
Operator
MIP (O-MIP)
L pu‹, x‹q
ě Ltarget Exitd‹
Operator LP Ppd‹, κ‹q
with reformulated
coupling constraints (O-LP1)
Operator LP (Dual)
min
λě0
`
b` Bd‹˘Jλ
s.t. AJλ ď c
yes
no
u‹, x‹
d‹
u‹ “ pβ‹, κ‹q, x‹
λ‹Jpb` Bdq
ě Lpu‹, x‹q ` 
Benders cut
Fig. 5: Computational approach to solve (Mm).
The attacker MIP can be written as follows:
min
dPt0,1uN
ř
iPN di
s.t. set of Benders cuts,
(A-MIP)
The master problem is initialized with only the integrality
and budget constraints on the attack variables, and with-
out any Benders cut. In each iteration, solving the master
problem (A-MIP), which is a bounded MIP, if feasible,
yields an attack d‹. Then, this attack vector is used as an
input parameter for the operator subproblem (O-MIP).
For a fixed disruption d‹, the operator subproblem is the
same as the inner problem of (Mm):
minuPU pd‹q L pu, xq
s.t. x P Xpuq, (11). (O-MIP)
The problem (O-MIP) is also a bounded MIP because the
load and DGs have bounded feasible space. If (O-MIP)
is feasible, it yields an optimal operator response u‹ and
network state x‹ for the disruption d‹. If the operator’s
loss L pu‹, x‹q exceeds the target loss Ltarget, the algorithm
terminates having successfully determined an optimal min-
cardinality attack. Otherwise, L pu‹, x‹q ă Ltarget which
implies that d‹ is not a successful disruption. In this case,
we need to generate a Benders cut to eliminate d‹ from
the feasible space of (A-MIP).
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To obtain a Benders cut, we select integer variables from
the operator response u‹ “ pβ‹, κ‹q; i.e. select the configu-
ration vector κ‹, and consider the LP in (O-LP). However,
we encounter an algorithmic issue which is as follows.
Recall that in problem (Mm), the constraints (10) involve
only the attack variables and operator binary variables.
These constraints model the fact that, in our formulation,
the DGs can get disconnected due to attacker actions as
well as the operator response. When we fix these attack
variables and inner binary variables in (10), the resulting
linear program (O-LP) has constraints of the form 0 ě 0,
1 ě 0 or 1 ě 1. The values of the optimal dual variables
(λ‹) corresponding to these constraints (10) turn out to
be 0, which are not useful in forming good Benders cuts.
To address this issue, we modify the constraints of (O-LP)
to ensure that the reformulated coupling constraints are
such that coefficients of the attack variables (d) and the
coefficients of inner continuous variables (pg, qg) are not
simultaneously zero. One way to achieve this is to replace
(4) and (10) by the following constraints:
kgi ě di, (13a)
pgi ď p1´ diqpgi, qgi ď p1´ diqqgi, (13b)
pgi ď p1´ kgiqpgi, qgi ď p1´ kgiqqgi, (13c)
pgi ě p1´ kgiqpgi, qgi ě p1´ kgiqqgi, (13d)
Note that (13a)-(13d) are equivalent to (4) and (10).4,5
With this replacement, the values of the optimal dual
variables (λ‹) corresponding to the constraints (13b) will
be non-zero, which ensures that useful Benders cuts will
be generated in each iteration of the BD algorithm. Thus,
we reformulate P pd, κq as follows:
P pd, κq “ min
βPB L pu, xq
s.t. u “ pβ, κq , (1)´ (3),
(5)´ (11), (13).
(O-LP1)
Note that problem (O-LP1) with parameters (d‹, κ‹)
can be simplified and rewritten as the following problem
whose dual is written alongside:
Primalhkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kkkkkkkkkkkkkkj
min
w
cJw
Dualhkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkj
max
λě0 pb`Bd
‹qJλ
s.t. Aeqw “ beq `Beqd‹ s.t. AJλ “ c
Ainw ě bin `Bind‹
(O-LP2)
Here w and λ are the primal and dual decision vector
variables; A “ rAeqJAinJsJ, B “ rBeqJBinJsJ are
4Using the constraints (4) and (13a)-(13b) is also equivalent to
using (4) and (10). However, when the former set of constraints
((4) and (13a)-(13b)) are used, the implementation solver (Gurobi)
assigns non-zero dual variables to the equality constraints (4) but
not to (13b), which results in rendering of ineffective Benders cuts.
Hence, (4) needs to be replaced by (13c)-(13d).
5Although for pdi, kgiq “ p1, 1q, the constraints (13c) and (13d)
are equivalent to (13b), the implementation solver assigns non-zero
dual variables to the inequality constraints that come up earlier in
the implementation. Hence, these two sets of inequality constraints
are placed after (13b).
matrices and b “ rbeqJbinJsJ is a vector of appropriate
dimensions.6 We solve the dual problem (thanks to strong
duality, the optimal values are the same) in (O-LP2) to
compute P pd‹, κ‹q and an optimal dual solution λ‹. This
furnishes a Benders cut, which is added to the master
problem in the next iteration. In particular, if the dual
problem in (O-LP2) has an optimal solution λ‹, and its
optimal value is L‹, then λ‹J pb`Bdq ě L‹ `  is the
desired Benders cut where  is a small positive number.
Note that d‹ does not satisfy this Benders cut constraint
because λ‹J pb`Bd‹q “ P pd‹, κ‹q “ L‹ ă L‹ ` , where
the first equality holds because of strong duality in linear
programs.
In each iteration, we eliminate suboptimal attacks from
the feasible space of (A-MIP). Hence, the new master
problem obtained by adding a Benders cut is a stronger
relaxation of (MCP). Consequently, we get a progressively
tighter lower bound on the minimum cardinality of the
attack as the iteration continues, until we get a successful
attack. Since there are a finite number of attacks, whether
successful or not, the BD algorithm is bound to termi-
nate.7 As we will see in Sec. VII, the BD algorithm takes
significantly fewer number of iterations in comparison to
a simple enumeration.
The choice of  in the generation of a Benders cut
is an important issue in our implementation of the BD
algorithm. If we choose too large an  then many at-
tacks (possibly including the optimal attacks) would be
eliminated from the set of feasible attacker strategies
in (A-MIP). If we choose too small an , then in each
iteration only the current min-cardinality attack vector is
eliminated resulting in performance no better than simple
enumeration over all attacks.
Remark 2. Although we have used a linear power flow
approximation in our formulation, our approach can be
generalized to consider the Second Order Cone approxi-
mation [28]. In this case, the formulation will be a Bilevel
Mixed-Integer Second Order Cone Program (BiMISOCP)
where the operator (inner) problem is an MISOCP. Our
solution approach can, in fact, be generalized to solve the
BiMISOCP by using the Generalized Benders Decompo-
sition method [29].
We now offer some comparative remarks about our
solution approach to (Mm) which – as mentioned earlier
– is a BiMIP with conflicting objectives in the inner (op-
erator) and outer (attacker) problems. In general, one can
reformulate a BiMIP as a single level MIP (for example,
via a high-point relaxation (HPR) problem [30, 31]), and
use an advanced branch-and-bound algorithm to solve
the problem. Note, however, the HPR is a weak relax-
ation of the original BiMIP due to directly conflicting
objectives [16, 32]. More recent work has developed in-
tersection cuts [33, 34] and disjunction cuts [35, 36] –
these approaches introduce stronger cuts for the HPR
6We refer the reader to the Appendix for a numerical example.
7For realistically large network sizes (N “ 118), the BD algorithm
terminates in approximately 10 minutes.
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problem. However, these approaches are only suitable for
BiMIPs in which the inner problem has integer coefficients
in the constraints. In contrast, our problem (Mm) has
fractional coefficients. A recent paper by Hua et. al [32]
addresses this issue by applying a Generalized Benders
decomposition method but without the min-cardinality
reformulation; as a result, the master problem in their
approach needs to handle a relatively larger number of
variables and constraints. Since in our solution approach
we apply the Min-cardinality reformulation, the result-
ing master problem has fewer variables and constraints.
Another approach by Zeng and An [37] uses a Column
Constraint Generation (CCG) method, whose iterations
progressively add variables and constraints (particularly
the disjuntive constraints resulting from the KKT condi-
tions for the inner problem with fixed binary variables).
While these approaches are certainly of interest in solving
(Mm), we find that our proposed approach achieves desir-
able computational performance as discussed in Sec. VII.
C. Randomized algorithm for worst case loss under au-
tonomous disconnections
For each cardinality k, we can compute the worst case
loss under the autonomous disconnections using simple
enumeration. However, that would required evaluating
loss over combinatorially many
`N
k
˘
attacks. Therefore, we
present a randomized algorithm to compute worst case loss
under the autonomous disconnections; see Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Random attacks and approximately worst
case attack for autonomous disconnections
Input: Z (number of random permutations)
1: Initialize Y “ 0NˆZ and V “ 0N
2: for t “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Z do
3: Generate a random permutation σ of nodes N
4: Reset d “ 0
5: for k “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,N do
6: Set dσpkq “ 1 {{ k cardinality attack
7: punr, xnrq Ð GetCascadeFinalState(d)
{{ Refer Algorithm 1 for GetCascadeFinalState
8: Y rk, ts Ð Lpunr, xnrq
9: end for
10: end for
11: for k “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,N do
12: V rks Ð maxtPrZs Y rk, ts
13: end for
14: return Y, V
The algorithm aims to achieve the following: for each
attack cardinality, it generates random attacks, computes
the loss due to autonomous component disconnects (us-
ing Algorithm 1), and then chooses the maximum among
all computed losses.
Specifically, for a given parameter Z (number of ran-
dom permutations) it initializes the entries of a matrix
Y P RNˆZ and a vector V P RN to zero. Next, for each
iteration t “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Z, it chooses a random permutation of
the DN nodes N, and resets d “ 0. Then, it incrementally
disrupts a DG belonging to a DN node in the order of
the chosen tth permutation, thereby obtaining a random
attack for each cardinality k. For each attack generated
in this manner, it computes the loss using Algorithm 1,
and stores it in Y rk, ts. After computing all entries of
the matrix Y , it computes for each attack cardinality k
the maximum maxtPrZs Y rk, ts over the computed losses.
As shown in Sec. VII, for any randomly chosen attack of
cardinality k ă N, if we disrupt one more DG, then the loss
incurred under autonomous disconnections will increase.
This monotonicity of increasing loss for increasing attack
cardinality cannot be shown if we simply choose N`1 ran-
dom attacks of cardinalities k P t0, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Nu, and plot the
loss values vs. k. This is the main idea behind Algorithm 2.
VII. Computational Study
We present computational results to show: (a) the value
of timely operator response compared to autonomous
disconnections; (b) comparison of the solutions of our BD
approach with the optimal solution (generated for small
networks by pure enumeration); and (c) the scalability of
our approach to larger networks.
Setup for computational study: We consider three
networks: 24 node, and modified IEEE 36 node and 118
node networks. Each line has an identical impedance of
rij “ 0.01,xij “ 0.02. Half of the nodes have a DG and
half have a load. Hence, the maximum cardinality of an
attack in our computational study will be half the number
of the nodes in the DN. Consider a parameter α “ 6N .
Before the contingency, each DG has active power output
of pgi “ α, and each load has a demand of pci “ 1.25α.
Thus, we assume 80% DG penetration since the total DG
output is 80% of the total demand. The voltage bounds
are vci “ 0.9, vci “ 1.1, vgi “ 0.92 and vgi “ 1.08.
The reactive power values are chosen to be exactly one
third that of the corresponding active power value, i.e. a
0.95 (lagging) power factor for each load and DG. The
values are chosen such that the total net active power
demand in the DN is 0.75 pu, and the lowest voltage
in the network before any contingency is close to vg.
The maximum load control parameter is β
i
“ 0.8, i.e. at
most 20% of each load demand can be curtailed. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that all DGs and loads are
homogeneous. The values of cost coefficients are chosen to
be WLC “ 100{pci,WVR “ 100 and WLS “ 1000{pci.
All experiments were performed on a 2.8 GHz Intel Core
i7 with 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 MacBook Pro laptop.
Value of timely response: Recall that in Sec. I, we used
post-contingency loss to define the resilience metric for
SA system response (RMm) and autonomous disconnection
(RAD) cases; and that RMm ě RAD. Fig. 6 compares the
resiliency values for the two cases (response (c) versus
autonomous disconnection (b)) for varying number of
nodes attacked, where computation of RMm (resp. RAD)
involves using the BD algorithm (resp. Algorithm 1). In
Fig. 6, the resilience curve due to response (b) under
random attacks is obtained by using Algorithm 2. We
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chose Z “ 500, and select 10 out of the Z random
permutations σ (see Algorithm 2) to generate the plot.
For a given cardinality k, the worst loss under autonomous
disconnections is estimated by choosing V rks.
Note that, in Fig. 6, for random attacks, the DN re-
silience under autonomous disconnections monotonically
decreases as the attack cardinality increases. Furthermore,
the worst case DN resilience quickly saturates, i.e. com-
promising around 20% of nodes has the same effect on
resilience as disrupting all DGs. Therefore, the algorithmic
choice of not computing the worst case loss under au-
tonomous disconnections by exhaustive enumeration over
all possible attacks in Algorithm 2 is justified.
Indeed, under autonomous disconnections, we find that
the voltage bound violations cause even the non-disrupted
DGs to disconnect resulting in a cascade. However, under
operator response, the SA detects these voltage bound
violations, and preemptively exercises load control and/or
disconnects the loads/DGs to reduce the total number of
non-disrupted DGs from being disconnected, and minimize
the impact of the attack. The difference between the
two resiliency curves gives the value of timely response
via the SA system. The intermediate curves in Fig. 6
correspond to the DN resilience under random attacks
and autonomous disconnections. Finally, when both a TN-
side disturbance and a DN attack are simultaneous, the
resilience metric of the DN decreases; see Fig. 6b.
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Fig. 6: Value of timely response (N “ 36).
Benders Decomposition method vs. Simple enumera-
tion: For a fixed cardinality k, we compute the optimal
loss L‹ using simple enumeration over all disruptions.
Then, we use L‹ as the parameter Ltarget for the problem
(MCP). If the BD algorithm applied to (MCP) computes
a successful attack with the same cardinality k, then
indeed we have obtained the optimal attack of cardinality
k. Fig. 7 shows that our method performs very well in
computing optimal attacks. The sub-optimality results
from the introduction of  in the Benders cuts; see Fig. 5.
Scalability of BD algorithm: We tabulate the com-
putational time required by the BD algorithm to com-
pute min-cardinality attacks for different network sizes
and varying values of the resilience metric Rtarget “
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Fig. 7: Accuracy of BD algorithm in computing resilience
metric in comparison to simple enumeration. Regime
change from ND to CD is marked.
Entries are resilience metric of DN (in percentage), number
of iterations (written in brackets), time (in seconds), attack
cardinality.
Rtarget N “ 24 N “ 36 N “ 118
99 98.75, (3), 0.04, 1 98.96, (11), 0.22, 5 98.52, (27), 1.86, 14
95 91.15, (6), 0.08, 2 93.82, (13), 0.27, 6 94.66, (39), 3.34, 17
90 89.75, (10), 0.16, 3 88.08, (15), 0.34, 8 89.94, (50), 5.44, 26
85 82.41, (11), 0.18, 4 82.93, (17), 0.4, 10 84.96, (69), 9.23, 44
80 74.38, (14), 0.26, 5 76.99, (21), 0.52, 14 79.71, (86), 613.42, 52
75 74.38, (14), 0.26, 5 71.1, (23), 0.59, 16 Failure
65 58.01, (20), 0.41, 9 Failure
55 49.65, (23), 0.47, 12
45 Failure
TABLE II: Resiliency metric evaluated using BD al-
gorithm. The realized resilience metric can significantly
fall short of the target resilience metric (Rtarget “
100 p1´ Ltarget{Lmaxq); for example, when the attack car-
dinality changes from 1 to 2, the percentage resilience for
24-node network decreases sharply from 98.75% to 91.15%
(which involves a change from the ND regime to the CD).
This means that the 24-node DN is at least 90% (actual
value 91.15%) resilient to k “ 2 cardinality attacks.
100 p1´ Ltarget{Lmaxq; see Table II. Note that even for
N “ 118 nodes, which has 2118 configuration vectors,
the BD algorithm finishes computations in «10 minutes.
In comparison, for N “ 36 node network, the simple
enumeration method took «2 hours. The failure cases in
Table II correspond to the cases where there does not exist
an attack vector that exceeds the target loss values.
VIII. Concluding remarks
In this article, we developed an approach to evaluate
the resilience of DNs under a class of cyber and physical
disruptions. We considered an attack model that involves a
TN-side voltage disturbance, and DN-side supply-demand
disturbance due to simultaneous DG disruptions. We also
estimated the value of timely operator response which
involves preemptive load control or component disconnec-
tions implemented via substation automation. Although
we use the linear power flow model for the sake of compu-
tational tractability, our main ideas are also relevant to a
convex relaxation of nonlinear power flows [29].
In the companion paper [13], we refine our model of
attacker-operator interaction. First, we extend the op-
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erator model to include (a) microgrid islanding capa-
bilities to form subnetworks that can operate without
being connected to the main grid, and (b) dispatch of
controllable distributed energy resources (DERs), which
have a significant potential to be viewed as contingency
reserves. These reserves can be dispatched to limit the im-
pact of contingencies resulting from cyber-physical failure
events. We also investigate how the system performance
can recovered by reconnection of the disrupted DGs and
loads, and changing the mode of microgrid operation from
islanded to grid-connected.
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Appendix
Example for problem (O-LP2): Recall the primal
problem in (O-LP2). With the help of an example, we
show how to instantiate the primal problem. Consider a
DN G with nodes t0, 1u and line p0, 1q. Then the variable
w is given as:
w “ pβ1, pg1, qg1, p1, q1, P1, Q1, v0, v1, tq,
where t is an auxiliary variable. The corresponding cost
vector c is given as:
c “ p´WLC, 0, 0, 0, 0,WAC, 0, 0, 0, 0,WVRq. (15)
Furthermore, we are given the parameters d and κ “
pkc1, kg1q. Then, the constraints of the problem (O-LP2)
are given as follows:
Ainhkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkj»————————————————————————————–
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ´1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ´1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ´1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ´1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ´1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ´1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
´1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ´1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
w ě
binhkkkkk kkkkkj»————————————————————————————–
pg1
´pg1
qg1
´qg1
p1´ kg1qpg1
´p1´ kg1qpg1
p1´ kg1qqg1
´p1´ kg1qqg1
vg1 ´ kg1´vg1 ` kg1
vc1 ´ kg1
´vc1 ` kg1
p1´ kc1qβ1´p1´ kc1q
vnom
´vnom
0
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
`
Binhkikj»————————————————————————————–
´pg1
pg1
´qg1
qg1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
d
Aeqhkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkj»——————–
0 0 0 ´1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ´1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 2r01 2x01 ´1 1 0
´pc1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
´qc1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiflw “
beqhkikj»——————–
0
0
0
0
0
0
fiffiffiffiffiffiffifl `
Beqhkikj»——————–
0
0
0
0
0
0
fiffiffiffiffiffiffifl d
Finally, A “
„
Ain
Aeq

, B “
„
Bin
Beq

, and b “
„
bin
beq

.
